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Realism, Relativism and Rhetoric

John D. Greenwood

Open publisher page 3 citations

Abstract

It is claimed here that the social constructionist `critiques' of scientific realism advanced by Jonathan Potter (1992) and John Shotter (1992) fail, both because they seriously misrepresent scientific realism, and because they provide no arguments or evidence to undermine the linguistic and epistemological objectivity of theories in natural and psychological science. A number of qualifications of scientific realism are made in the light of Rom Harrd's (1992) criticisms, which support a form of global epistemological relativism about scientific theories, but not forms of local epistemological relativism with respect to competing explanatory theories.

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What this paper is about

It is claimed here that the social constructionist `critiques' of scientific realism advanced by Jonathan Potter (1992) and John Shotter (1992) fail, both because they seriously misrepresent scientific realism, and because they provide no arguments or evidence to undermine the linguistic and epistemological objectivity of theories in natural and psychological science. A number of qualifications of scientific realism are made in the light of Rom Harrd's (1992) criticisms, which support a form of global epistemological relativism about scientific theories, but not forms of local epistemological relativism with respect to competing explanatory theories.

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Available abstract

It is claimed here that the social constructionist `critiques' of scientific realism advanced by Jonathan Potter (1992) and John Shotter (1992) fail, both because they seriously misrepresent scientific realism, and because they provide no arguments or evidence to undermine the linguistic and epistemological objectivity of theories in natural and psychological science. A number of qualifications of scientific realism are made in the light of Rom Harrd's (1992) criticisms, which support a form of global epistemological relativism about scientific theories, but not forms of local epistemological relativism with respect to competing explanatory theories.

Key concepts: Relativism, Epistemology, Scientific realism, Objectivity (philosophy), Realism, Philosophical realism, Rhetoric, Philosophy of science

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