2009Process Safety ProgressRequires access

Determine SIS and SIL using HAZOPS

Héctor Javier Cruz‐Campa, M. Javier Cruz‐Gómez

Open publisher page 13 citations

Abstract

Abstract A simplified quantitative analysis methodology for the determination of required Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and the associated target Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) is presented. As prerequisites, the company policy for risk acceptability and a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study are needed. A risk acceptability criterion for large commodity chemical, petrochemical, or refining companies is discussed. The methodology starts with the selection of high potential risk scenarios from the HAZOP study. Then the effectiveness of the relevant process safeguards is evaluated based on layers of protection analysis, to assess if there are adequate and sufficient safety protection layers in the chemical process, so that the actual risk of the process is at an acceptable level. The method allows the user to determine first if a SIS is required and then, what SIL is required for each function it performs. If a SIS already exists in the process, the methodology can be used to verify the required SIL for each safety instrumented function. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2010

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Abstract A simplified quantitative analysis methodology for the determination of required Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and the associated target Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) is presented. As prerequisites, the company policy for risk acceptability and a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study are needed. A risk acceptability criterion for large commodity chemical, petrochemical, or refining companies is discussed. The methodology starts with the selection of high potential risk scenarios from the HAZOP study. Then the effectiveness of the relevant process safeguards is evaluated based on layers of protection analysis, to assess if there are adequate and sufficient safety protection layers in the chemical process, so that the actual risk of the process is at an acceptable level. The method allows the user to determine first if a SIS is required and then, what SIL is required for each function it performs. If a SIS already exists in the process, the methodology can be used to verify the required SIL for each safety instrumented function. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2010

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 13 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Abstract A simplified quantitative analysis methodology for the determination of required Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and the associated target Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) is presented. As prerequisites, the company policy for risk acceptability and a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study are needed. A risk acceptability criterion for large commodity chemical, petrochemical, or refining companies is discussed. The methodology starts with the selection of high potential risk scenarios from the HAZOP study. Then the effectiveness of the relevant process safeguards is evaluated based on layers of protection analysis, to assess if there are adequate and sufficient safety protection layers in the chemical process, so that the actual risk of the process is at an acceptable level. The method allows the user to determine first if a SIS is required and then, what SIL is required for each function it performs. If a SIS already exists in the process, the methodology can be used to verify the required SIL for each safety instrumented function. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2010

Key concepts: Hazard and operability study, Process safety, Operability, Reliability engineering, Risk analysis (engineering), Hazard, Process safety management, Process (computing)

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Determine SIS and SIL using HAZOPS — Research Paper | ScholarLens