2001Australian Economic ReviewRequires access

Some Economics of Safe Injecting Rooms

Harry Clarke

Open publisher page 8 citations

Abstract

Provision of safe injecting rooms (SIRs), needle exchanges and other harm minimisation schemes reduce mortality and other health risks that illicit drug users experience. However, SIRs diminish incentives to refrain from the use of drugs by reducing the risk of a key harmful consequence of use, namely the user's death. Moreover, such harm minimisation efforts are socially costly. Economic approaches to drug management balance benefits from harm minimisation against policy costs and the costs associated with a failure of community drug abstinence. This article shows that the economic case for SIRs disappears with conservative assumptions about adverse incentive effects of reduced mortality risks even when only modest weight is placed on drug abstinence objectives.

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What this paper is about

Provision of safe injecting rooms (SIRs), needle exchanges and other harm minimisation schemes reduce mortality and other health risks that illicit drug users experience. However, SIRs diminish incentives to refrain from the use of drugs by reducing the risk of a key harmful consequence of use, namely the user's death. Moreover, such harm minimisation efforts are socially costly. Economic approaches to drug management balance benefits from harm minimisation against policy costs and the costs associated with a failure of community drug abstinence. This article shows that the economic case for SIRs disappears with conservative assumptions about adverse incentive effects of reduced mortality risks even when only modest weight is placed on drug abstinence objectives.

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Available abstract

Provision of safe injecting rooms (SIRs), needle exchanges and other harm minimisation schemes reduce mortality and other health risks that illicit drug users experience. However, SIRs diminish incentives to refrain from the use of drugs by reducing the risk of a key harmful consequence of use, namely the user's death. Moreover, such harm minimisation efforts are socially costly. Economic approaches to drug management balance benefits from harm minimisation against policy costs and the costs associated with a failure of community drug abstinence. This article shows that the economic case for SIRs disappears with conservative assumptions about adverse incentive effects of reduced mortality risks even when only modest weight is placed on drug abstinence objectives.

Key concepts: Harm, Minimisation (clinical trials), Incentive, Abstinence, Public economics, Business, Externality, Actuarial science

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