Hidden assumptions in cryptographic protocols
Colin Boyd
Abstract
Colin Boyd
Abstract
It is shown that some well known cryptographic protocols for authentication are insecure if the underlying cryptographic algorithm does not avoid certain special features. Explicit assumptions based on the fundamental properties of cryptographic transformations are recommended as a basis for cryptographic protocol design. It is shown how these properties may be used to design alternative forms of the protocols analysed.
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It is shown that some well known cryptographic protocols for authentication are insecure if the underlying cryptographic algorithm does not avoid certain special features. Explicit assumptions based on the fundamental properties of cryptographic transformations are recommended as a basis for cryptographic protocol design. It is shown how these properties may be used to design alternative forms of the protocols analysed.
Key concepts: Cryptographic protocol, Cryptographic primitive, Cryptography, Computer science, Protocol (science), Hash-based message authentication code, Authentication protocol, Security of cryptographic hash functions