1995•Unpublished venueOpen access
The probability of containment failure by direct containment heating in surry
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (United States). Div. of Safety Technology, M Pilch, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (United States), Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States), IL (United States) Argonne National Lab., M Allen, K Bergeron, E Tadios, D Stamps, B Spencer, K Quick, D Knudson
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Abstract
In a light-water reactor core melt accident, if the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) fails while the reactor coolant system (RCS) at high pressure, the expulsion of molten core debris may pressurize the reactor containment building (RCB) beyond its failure pressure. A failure in the bottom head of the RPV, followed by melt expulsion and blowdown of the RCS, will entrain molten core debris in the high-velocity steam blowdown gas. This chain of events is called a high-pressure melt ejection (HPME). Four mechanisms may cause a rapid increase in pressure and temperature in the reactor containment: (1) blowdown of the RCS, (2) efficient debris-to-gas heat transfer, (3) exothermic metal-steam and metal-oxygen reactions, and (4) hydrogen combustion. These processes, which lead to increased loads on the containment building, are collectively referred to as direct containment heating (DCH). It is necessary to understand factors that enhance or mitigate DCH because the pressure load imposed on the RCB may lead to early failure of the containment.