Can “pure” implicit memory be isolated? A test of a single-system model of recognition and repetition priming.
Christopher J. Berry, David R. Shanks, Selina Li, Luke Sheridan Rains, Richard N. Henson
Abstract
Christopher J. Berry, David R. Shanks, Selina Li, Luke Sheridan Rains, Richard N. Henson
Abstract
Implicit memory is widely regarded as an unconscious form of memory. However, evidence for what is arguably a defining characteristic of implicit memory-that its contents are not accessible to awareness-has remained elusive. Such a finding of "pure" implicit memory would constitute evidence against a single-system model of recognition and priming that predicts that priming will not occur in the (true) absence of recognition. In three experiments, using a rapid serial visual presentation procedure at encoding, we tested this prediction by attempting to replicate some previous studies that claimed to obtain pure implicit memory. We found no evidence of priming in the absence of recognition; instead, priming and recognition were associated across experiments: when priming was absent, recognition was also absent (Experiments 1 and 2), and when priming was reliably greater than chance, recognition was similarly greater than chance (Experiment 3). The results are consistent with the prediction of a single-system model, which was fit to the data from all the experiments. The results are also consistent with the notion that the memory driving priming is accessible to awareness.
OpenAlex reports 22 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Implicit memory is widely regarded as an unconscious form of memory. However, evidence for what is arguably a defining characteristic of implicit memory-that its contents are not accessible to awareness-has remained elusive. Such a finding of "pure" implicit memory would constitute evidence against a single-system model of recognition and priming that predicts that priming will not occur in the (true) absence of recognition. In three experiments, using a rapid serial visual presentation procedure at encoding, we tested this prediction by attempting to replicate some previous studies that claimed to obtain pure implicit memory. We found no evidence of priming in the absence of recognition; instead, priming and recognition were associated across experiments: when priming was absent, recognition was also absent (Experiments 1 and 2), and when priming was reliably greater than chance, recognition was similarly greater than chance (Experiment 3). The results are consistent with the prediction of a single-system model, which was fit to the data from all the experiments. The results are also consistent with the notion that the memory driving priming is accessible to awareness.
Key concepts: Implicit memory, Priming (agriculture), Explicit memory, Repetition priming, Cognitive psychology, Recognition memory, Encoding (memory), Psychology