1990Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual MeetingRequires access

Analysis of General Aviation Accidents during Operations under Instrument Flight Rules

C. Thomas Bennett, Martin F. J. Schwirzke, Carl S. Harm

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Abstract

The purpose of this analysis was to describe some of the errors that pilots make during flight under instrument flight rules (IFR). The data suggest that there is less risk during the approach and landing phase of IFR flights, as compared to operations under visual flight rules. During the 1980s, there was a large increase in the number of single-pilot IFR (SPIFR) accidents. Most of these were the result of an increase in air taxi accidents. But, because of the increase in air taxi operations, there was no change in the SPIFR rate. SPIFR accident rates continue to be higher than dual-pilot IFR, reflecting the high work load of IFR operations. Night SPIFR continues to be dangerous; its rate is almost 10 times the rate of day IFR, and twice that of day non-IFR operations. The relatively static nature of the statistics for IFR accident rates may be accounted for by (1) the fact that there has been little change in general aviation cockpit technology during the last 25 years, (2) training techniques have not had an impact on pilot operations, and/or (3) current display technology promotes certain types of pilot errors that are virtually immune to training.

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What this paper is about

The purpose of this analysis was to describe some of the errors that pilots make during flight under instrument flight rules (IFR). The data suggest that there is less risk during the approach and landing phase of IFR flights, as compared to operations under visual flight rules. During the 1980s, there was a large increase in the number of single-pilot IFR (SPIFR) accidents. Most of these were the result of an increase in air taxi accidents. But, because of the increase in air taxi operations, there was no change in the SPIFR rate. SPIFR accident rates continue to be higher than dual-pilot IFR, reflecting the high work load of IFR operations. Night SPIFR continues to be dangerous; its rate is almost 10 times the rate of day IFR, and twice that of day non-IFR operations. The relatively static nature of the statistics for IFR accident rates may be accounted for by (1) the fact that there has been little change in general aviation cockpit technology during the last 25 years, (2) training techniques have not had an impact on pilot operations, and/or (3) current display technology promotes certain types of pilot errors that are virtually immune to training.

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Available abstract

The purpose of this analysis was to describe some of the errors that pilots make during flight under instrument flight rules (IFR). The data suggest that there is less risk during the approach and landing phase of IFR flights, as compared to operations under visual flight rules. During the 1980s, there was a large increase in the number of single-pilot IFR (SPIFR) accidents. Most of these were the result of an increase in air taxi accidents. But, because of the increase in air taxi operations, there was no change in the SPIFR rate. SPIFR accident rates continue to be higher than dual-pilot IFR, reflecting the high work load of IFR operations. Night SPIFR continues to be dangerous; its rate is almost 10 times the rate of day IFR, and twice that of day non-IFR operations. The relatively static nature of the statistics for IFR accident rates may be accounted for by (1) the fact that there has been little change in general aviation cockpit technology during the last 25 years, (2) training techniques have not had an impact on pilot operations, and/or (3) current display technology promotes certain types of pilot errors that are virtually immune to training.

Key concepts: Aeronautics, Cockpit, Aviation, Aviation safety, General aviation, Aviation accident, Engineering, Work (physics)

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