ScholarLens Back to search
2011•Journal of Biological DynamicsRequires access

Darwinian dynamics and evolutionary game theory

Thomas L. Vincent, Thomas L. Vincent, Tania L.S. Vincent, Tania L.S. Vincent, Yosef A. Cohen

Open publisher page 7 citations

Abstract

Evolutionary games, here modelled by systems of ordinary differential equations, encapsulate Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. An evolutionary game can reach a local minimum, allowing invasion by mutants to drive the system out of its minimum and engender speciation. Games based on optimality considerations do not resist invasion. Nash equilibrium does not resolve to evolutionary stable strategies – mutants can invade existing communities of species.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Evolutionary games, here modelled by systems of ordinary differential equations, encapsulate Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. An evolutionary game can reach a local minimum, allowing invasion by mutants to drive the system out of its minimum and engender speciation. Games based on optimality considerations do not resist invasion. Nash equilibrium does not resolve to evolutionary stable strategies – mutants can invade existing communities of species.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 7 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Evolutionary games, here modelled by systems of ordinary differential equations, encapsulate Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. An evolutionary game can reach a local minimum, allowing invasion by mutants to drive the system out of its minimum and engender speciation. Games based on optimality considerations do not resist invasion. Nash equilibrium does not resolve to evolutionary stable strategies – mutants can invade existing communities of species.

Key concepts: Evolutionary dynamics, Evolutionary game theory, Darwinism, Natural selection, Evolutionarily stable strategy, Nash equilibrium, Genetic algorithm, Evolutionary biology

Related papers

Related paper 1Related paper 2Related paper 3
Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Darwinian dynamics and evolutionary game theory — Research Paper | ScholarLens