1991Compensation & Benefits ReviewRequires access

Beyond Stock Options: Emerging Practices in Executive Incentive Programs

Ira Kay

Open publisher page 1 citations

Abstract

By using long-term compensation mechanisms that entail risk as well as the potential for gain, companies can strongly motivate executives to try to increase shareholder value.

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What this paper is about

By using long-term compensation mechanisms that entail risk as well as the potential for gain, companies can strongly motivate executives to try to increase shareholder value.

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OpenAlex reports 1 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

By using long-term compensation mechanisms that entail risk as well as the potential for gain, companies can strongly motivate executives to try to increase shareholder value.

Key concepts: Stock options, Executive compensation, Incentive, Non-qualified stock option, Business, Shareholder, Shareholder value, Stock (firearms)

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