Researches on Duopolistic Price Competition in Homogenous Markets
Xudong Lin, Lijun Ma
Abstract
Xudong Lin, Lijun Ma
Abstract
The adoption of price comparison technology can make electronic markets more competitive, hence affecting the competitive dynamics of online sales. In the case of duopolistic homogenous goods market, multi-period dynamic pricing game models are suggest used to analyze how the prices in electronic markets evolve with the diffusion of price comparison shopping technology and probe into related fundamental theoretical proxies. Our results show: (i) the average price within the support of equilibrium price decrease with the development of electronic markets, at the rate positively related to the diffusion rate of price comparison technology. (ii) the larger the difference between firms' loyal segments is, the higher average price within the support of equilibrium price would be . And (iii) the higher accepted degree of customer for online goods can bring in the according higher average price.
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The adoption of price comparison technology can make electronic markets more competitive, hence affecting the competitive dynamics of online sales. In the case of duopolistic homogenous goods market, multi-period dynamic pricing game models are suggest used to analyze how the prices in electronic markets evolve with the diffusion of price comparison shopping technology and probe into related fundamental theoretical proxies. Our results show: (i) the average price within the support of equilibrium price decrease with the development of electronic markets, at the rate positively related to the diffusion rate of price comparison technology. (ii) the larger the difference between firms' loyal segments is, the higher average price within the support of equilibrium price would be . And (iii) the higher accepted degree of customer for online goods can bring in the according higher average price.
Key concepts: Electronic markets, Competition (biology), Price formation, Microeconomics, Economics, Price discrimination, Industrial organization, Limit price