2009Economic InquiryRequires access

COLLUSION FACILITATING AND COLLUSION BREAKING POWER OF SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AND DESCENDING PRICE AUCTIONS

Alexander L. Brown, Charles R. Plott, HEIDI J. SULLIVAN

Open publisher page 21 citations

Abstract

This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a “collusion incubator” environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion‐producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions. These theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion. The experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator. Then, once the tacit collusion developed, changing to the descending auction. The change moved prices from collusive levels to near‐competitive levels. (JEL C71, C92, D43, D44)

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What this paper is about

This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a “collusion incubator” environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion‐producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions. These theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion. The experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator. Then, once the tacit collusion developed, changing to the descending auction. The change moved prices from collusive levels to near‐competitive levels. (JEL C71, C92, D43, D44)

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OpenAlex reports 21 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a “collusion incubator” environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion‐producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions. These theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion. The experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator. Then, once the tacit collusion developed, changing to the descending auction. The change moved prices from collusive levels to near‐competitive levels. (JEL C71, C92, D43, D44)

Key concepts: Collusion, Tacit collusion, Common value auction, Economics, Microeconomics, Price fixing

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