A SIMPLE AXIOMATIZATION OF THE EGALITARIAN SOLUTION
İsmail Sağlam
Abstract
İsmail Sağlam
Abstract
In this paper, we present a simple axiomatization of the n-person egalitarian solution. The single condition sufficient for characterization is a new axiom, called symmetric decomposability that combines the axioms of step-by-step negotiations, symmetry, and weak Pareto optimality used in an early characterization by Kalai [(1977) Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: Interpersonal utility comparisons, Econometrica45, 1623–1630].
OpenAlex reports 3 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
In this paper, we present a simple axiomatization of the n-person egalitarian solution. The single condition sufficient for characterization is a new axiom, called symmetric decomposability that combines the axioms of step-by-step negotiations, symmetry, and weak Pareto optimality used in an early characterization by Kalai [(1977) Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: Interpersonal utility comparisons, Econometrica45, 1623–1630].
Key concepts: Axiom, Simple (philosophy), Characterization (materials science), Mathematical economics, Mathematics, Negotiation, Pareto principle, Pareto optimal