1996Southeastern Political ReviewRequires access

SOLICITOR GENERAL, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT, AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING

Reginald S. Sheehan

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Abstract

This study focuses on the relationship between the Solicitor General and the Supreme Court in cases involving the federal government as a direct party in litigation. Particular attention is given to the impact of presidential appointments on the success of the federal government in litigation. The analyses indicate that there are differences in success rates for the federal government when we control for the effects of different presidential administrations, different solicitors general, issue areas, and changes in the Court's ideological composition over time. Multivariate analysis demonstrates that changes in the Supreme Court brought about by presidential appointment combined with the ideological position taken by the solicitor general in the case has a significant impact on the success of the federal government in litigation.

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What this paper is about

This study focuses on the relationship between the Solicitor General and the Supreme Court in cases involving the federal government as a direct party in litigation. Particular attention is given to the impact of presidential appointments on the success of the federal government in litigation. The analyses indicate that there are differences in success rates for the federal government when we control for the effects of different presidential administrations, different solicitors general, issue areas, and changes in the Court's ideological composition over time. Multivariate analysis demonstrates that changes in the Supreme Court brought about by presidential appointment combined with the ideological position taken by the solicitor general in the case has a significant impact on the success of the federal government in litigation.

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Available abstract

This study focuses on the relationship between the Solicitor General and the Supreme Court in cases involving the federal government as a direct party in litigation. Particular attention is given to the impact of presidential appointments on the success of the federal government in litigation. The analyses indicate that there are differences in success rates for the federal government when we control for the effects of different presidential administrations, different solicitors general, issue areas, and changes in the Court's ideological composition over time. Multivariate analysis demonstrates that changes in the Supreme Court brought about by presidential appointment combined with the ideological position taken by the solicitor general in the case has a significant impact on the success of the federal government in litigation.

Key concepts: Supreme court, Presidential system, Government (linguistics), Ideology, Political science, Law, Position (finance), Supreme Court Decisions

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