Poor convexity and Nash equilibria in games
Tadeusz Radzik
Abstract
Open-access reader
Tadeusz Radzik
Abstract
Open-access reader
This paper considers two-person non-zero-sum games on the unit square with payoff functions having a new property called poor convexity. This property describes “something between” the classical convexity and quasi-convexity. It is proved that various types of such games have Nash equilibria with a very simple structure, consisting of the players’ mixed strategies with at most two-element supports. Since poor convexity is a basic notion in the paper, also a theory of poorly convex functions is also developed.
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This paper considers two-person non-zero-sum games on the unit square with payoff functions having a new property called poor convexity. This property describes “something between” the classical convexity and quasi-convexity. It is proved that various types of such games have Nash equilibria with a very simple structure, consisting of the players’ mixed strategies with at most two-element supports. Since poor convexity is a basic notion in the paper, also a theory of poorly convex functions is also developed.
Key concepts: Convexity, Mathematical economics, Nash equilibrium, Property (philosophy), Mathematics, Best response, Simple (philosophy), Stochastic game