2010•Economics LettersRequires access

Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

Rui Jun Li

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Key concepts: Imperfect, Repeated game, Folk theorem, Private information retrieval, Microeconomics, Mathematical economics, Perfect information, Computer science

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