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1994•Economics and PoliticsRequires access

RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS*

Tyler Cowen, Amihai Glazer, Henry M. McMillan

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Abstract

Public officials often have little incentive to spend time and effort proposing policies that benefit others. When, however, some public policies generate rents to these officials, rent seeking in politics can motivate them to provide public goods. We consider the motivational effects of rent seeking on (i) policy, (ii) the the role of agenda‐setting in social choice theory, (iii) the effects of graft and corruption in government, and (iv) the validity of cost‐benefit analysis.

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What this paper is about

Public officials often have little incentive to spend time and effort proposing policies that benefit others. When, however, some public policies generate rents to these officials, rent seeking in politics can motivate them to provide public goods. We consider the motivational effects of rent seeking on (i) policy, (ii) the the role of agenda‐setting in social choice theory, (iii) the effects of graft and corruption in government, and (iv) the validity of cost‐benefit analysis.

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OpenAlex reports 24 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

Public officials often have little incentive to spend time and effort proposing policies that benefit others. When, however, some public policies generate rents to these officials, rent seeking in politics can motivate them to provide public goods. We consider the motivational effects of rent seeking on (i) policy, (ii) the the role of agenda‐setting in social choice theory, (iii) the effects of graft and corruption in government, and (iv) the validity of cost‐benefit analysis.

Key concepts: Business, Public good, Rent-seeking, Public economics, Economics, Microeconomics, Political science, Politics

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RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* — Research Paper | ScholarLens