2001Behavioral Sciences & the LawRequires access

To warn and to control: two distinct legal obligations or variations of a single duty to protect?

Alan R. Felthous, Claudia Kachigian

Open publisher page 14 citations

Abstract

Prior to the Tarasoff decisions, jurisprudence pertaining to the duty to warn, or inform, to prevent violence to third persons, was separate from that pertaining to the duty to control to prevent such violence. The Tarasoff Principle consolidated preventive obligations in the face of foreseeable violence under a single "duty to protect." Even as courts adopted divergent rules for establishing foreseeability, many held to a single duty to protect with warnings as one possibility for fulfilling this option. Particularly over the past decade, courts have again disengaged the duty to warn and the duty to control, each requiring different legal predicates to occur. In recent years, courts have upheld or rejected a duty to warn, upheld or rejected a duty to control; and several courts have, within a single opinion, articulated fundamental distinctions between these two separate protective duties.

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What this paper is about

Prior to the Tarasoff decisions, jurisprudence pertaining to the duty to warn, or inform, to prevent violence to third persons, was separate from that pertaining to the duty to control to prevent such violence. The Tarasoff Principle consolidated preventive obligations in the face of foreseeable violence under a single "duty to protect." Even as courts adopted divergent rules for establishing foreseeability, many held to a single duty to protect with warnings as one possibility for fulfilling this option. Particularly over the past decade, courts have again disengaged the duty to warn and the duty to control, each requiring different legal predicates to occur. In recent years, courts have upheld or rejected a duty to warn, upheld or rejected a duty to control; and several courts have, within a single opinion, articulated fundamental distinctions between these two separate protective duties.

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OpenAlex reports 14 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

Prior to the Tarasoff decisions, jurisprudence pertaining to the duty to warn, or inform, to prevent violence to third persons, was separate from that pertaining to the duty to control to prevent such violence. The Tarasoff Principle consolidated preventive obligations in the face of foreseeable violence under a single "duty to protect." Even as courts adopted divergent rules for establishing foreseeability, many held to a single duty to protect with warnings as one possibility for fulfilling this option. Particularly over the past decade, courts have again disengaged the duty to warn and the duty to control, each requiring different legal predicates to occur. In recent years, courts have upheld or rejected a duty to warn, upheld or rejected a duty to control; and several courts have, within a single opinion, articulated fundamental distinctions between these two separate protective duties.

Key concepts: Duty, Duty to warn, Duty to protect, Jurisprudence, Law, Control (management), Gun control, Political science

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