An Identity Based Aggregate Signature from Pairings
Yike Yu, Xuefeng Zheng, Hua Sun
Abstract
Yike Yu, Xuefeng Zheng, Hua Sun
Abstract
An aggregate signature is a useful digital signature that supports aggregation: Given n signatures on n distinct messages from n distinct users, aggregate signature scheme is possible to aggregate all these signature into a single short signature. This single signature, along with the n original messages will convince any verifier that the n users did indeed sign the n original messages respectively (i.e., for i=1,...,n user i signed message m i ). In this paper, we propose an identity based aggregate signature scheme which requires constant pairing operations in the verification and the size of aggregate signature is independent of the number of signers. We prove that the proposed signature scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptively chosen message and identity attack in the random oracle model assuming the intractability of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
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An aggregate signature is a useful digital signature that supports aggregation: Given n signatures on n distinct messages from n distinct users, aggregate signature scheme is possible to aggregate all these signature into a single short signature. This single signature, along with the n original messages will convince any verifier that the n users did indeed sign the n original messages respectively (i.e., for i=1,...,n user i signed message m i ). In this paper, we propose an identity based aggregate signature scheme which requires constant pairing operations in the verification and the size of aggregate signature is independent of the number of signers. We prove that the proposed signature scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptively chosen message and identity attack in the random oracle model assuming the intractability of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
Key concepts: Computer science, Aggregate (composite), Signature (topology), Identity (music), Computer security, Mathematics, Composite material, Geometry