Making the Dissonant Act Unreflective of Self
Claude M. Steele, Thomas J. Liu
Abstract
Claude M. Steele, Thomas J. Liu
Abstract
It was predicted that when a counterattitudinal act is accompanied by the expectation of a future response which can affirm the contradicted attitude or value, dissonance and subsequent dissonance-reducing attitude change would be inhibited, even if the affirming response could not reconcile the specific inconsistency or eliminate the unwanted consequences of the discrepant act. The expectation of a value-affirming response is assumed to provide a context of cognitions in which the single discrepant act can be viewed as less indicative of a self-disposition, and consequently as less important—a perception that should result in less dissonance arousal. This reasoning was supported by the finding that among subjects who wrote counterattitudinal essays opposing more funding for handicap facilities under high choice instructions, those who expected a later, unrelated opportunity to help blind students showed no dissonance-reducing attitude change. Results are discussed as to their implications about the circumstances under which cognitive change will be a response to counterattitudinal behavior.
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It was predicted that when a counterattitudinal act is accompanied by the expectation of a future response which can affirm the contradicted attitude or value, dissonance and subsequent dissonance-reducing attitude change would be inhibited, even if the affirming response could not reconcile the specific inconsistency or eliminate the unwanted consequences of the discrepant act. The expectation of a value-affirming response is assumed to provide a context of cognitions in which the single discrepant act can be viewed as less indicative of a self-disposition, and consequently as less important—a perception that should result in less dissonance arousal. This reasoning was supported by the finding that among subjects who wrote counterattitudinal essays opposing more funding for handicap facilities under high choice instructions, those who expected a later, unrelated opportunity to help blind students showed no dissonance-reducing attitude change. Results are discussed as to their implications about the circumstances under which cognitive change will be a response to counterattitudinal behavior.
Key concepts: Cognitive dissonance, Consonance and dissonance, Psychology, Attitude change, Self-justification, Social psychology, Self-perception theory, Value (mathematics)