von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles
Steve Dowrick
Abstract
Steve Dowrick
Abstract
Under what circumstances will firms agree on the choice of roles of leader and follower in the von Stackelberg duopoly model? A key determinant is the slope of the firms' reaction function (in either price or quantity space). The duopolists will disagree over the choice of roles if they have downward-sloping reaction functions. Each will prefer to be the leader. They will also disagree if they have upward-sloping reaction functions and similar profit functions. Each will prefer that the other be the leader. Preferences between von Stackelberg and Cournot outcomes are also considered.
OpenAlex reports 253 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Under what circumstances will firms agree on the choice of roles of leader and follower in the von Stackelberg duopoly model? A key determinant is the slope of the firms' reaction function (in either price or quantity space). The duopolists will disagree over the choice of roles if they have downward-sloping reaction functions. Each will prefer to be the leader. They will also disagree if they have upward-sloping reaction functions and similar profit functions. Each will prefer that the other be the leader. Preferences between von Stackelberg and Cournot outcomes are also considered.
Key concepts: Stackelberg competition, Cournot competition, Duopoly, Microeconomics, Economics, Profit (economics), Function (biology), Mathematical economics