The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private and Public Provision of Public Goods
Kai A. Konrad
Abstract
Kai A. Konrad
Abstract
When people know that a public good is to be privately provided in the future, economic behavior may change in periods before the one with the private provision game. Individuals have a distortionary incentive to reduce their disposable income so as to shift the burden of provision to others. The incentive is eliminated if the government provides a sufficient amount of the public good. In a second-best world, private provision of public goods has been claimed to be a reasonably good alternative to public provision. This claim needs to be reconsidered in light of these results. Copyright 1994 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
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When people know that a public good is to be privately provided in the future, economic behavior may change in periods before the one with the private provision game. Individuals have a distortionary incentive to reduce their disposable income so as to shift the burden of provision to others. The incentive is eliminated if the government provides a sufficient amount of the public good. In a second-best world, private provision of public goods has been claimed to be a reasonably good alternative to public provision. This claim needs to be reconsidered in light of these results. Copyright 1994 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Key concepts: Public good, Incentive, Private good, Government (linguistics), Public economics, Business, Economics, Microeconomics