2008Unpublished venueRequires access

Empirical Study on Factors of Executive Equity Incentive Levels-Based on Listed Companies in China after Equity Division Reform

Huihui Yang, GE Wen-lei

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Abstract

We test the factors which affect the executive equity-based incentive levels after equity division reform, and get a different conclusion from prevenient domestic research. The equity-based incentive levels are significant negative correlation with equity concentration, the character of controlling shareholder, the proportion of independent directors and the enterprise scale. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant negative correlation with the proportion of institutional investors and debt in the capital structure. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant positive correlation with the company's growth, risk and market competition. This indicates that the internal control problem in China's listed companies have been some improvement after equity division reform.

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What this paper is about

We test the factors which affect the executive equity-based incentive levels after equity division reform, and get a different conclusion from prevenient domestic research. The equity-based incentive levels are significant negative correlation with equity concentration, the character of controlling shareholder, the proportion of independent directors and the enterprise scale. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant negative correlation with the proportion of institutional investors and debt in the capital structure. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant positive correlation with the company's growth, risk and market competition. This indicates that the internal control problem in China's listed companies have been some improvement after equity division reform.

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Available abstract

We test the factors which affect the executive equity-based incentive levels after equity division reform, and get a different conclusion from prevenient domestic research. The equity-based incentive levels are significant negative correlation with equity concentration, the character of controlling shareholder, the proportion of independent directors and the enterprise scale. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant negative correlation with the proportion of institutional investors and debt in the capital structure. The equity-based incentive levels are non-significant positive correlation with the company's growth, risk and market competition. This indicates that the internal control problem in China's listed companies have been some improvement after equity division reform.

Key concepts: Equity capital markets, Equity risk, Incentive, Equity ratio, Equity (law), Business, Private equity fund, China

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