1988The RAND Journal of EconomicsRequires access

Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger

Henrick Horn, Asher Wolinsky

Open publisher page 753 citations

Abstract

The paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. It combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri ...

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The paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. It combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri ...

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OpenAlex reports 753 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

The paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. It combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri ...

Key concepts: Duopoly, Monopoly, Incentive, Microeconomics, Industrial organization, Economics, Bargaining power, Business

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