An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
Bezalel Peleg
Abstract
Bezalel Peleg
Abstract
We provide an axiomatization of the core of market games (totally balanced coalitional games). We prove that the core is fully characterized by the following five independent properties: (i) nonemptiness; (ii) individual rationality; (iii) superadditivity; (iv) the weak reduced game property; and (v) the converse reduced game property. Also, we consider a possible alternative characterization.
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We provide an axiomatization of the core of market games (totally balanced coalitional games). We prove that the core is fully characterized by the following five independent properties: (i) nonemptiness; (ii) individual rationality; (iii) superadditivity; (iv) the weak reduced game property; and (v) the converse reduced game property. Also, we consider a possible alternative characterization.
Key concepts: Superadditivity, Converse, Mathematics, Mathematical economics, Core (optical fiber), Characterization (materials science), Property (philosophy), Rationality