Non-Representational Language in Mipam’s Re-Presentation of Other-Emptiness
Douglas Samuel Duckworth
Abstract
Open-access reader
Douglas Samuel Duckworth
Abstract
Open-access reader
This essay probes the discourses of other-emptiness in the Jonang (jo nang) and Nyingma (rnying ma) traditions. After briefly introducing other-emptiness in Jonang, the locus classicus for other-emptiness in Tibet, I contrast the way Mipam (‘ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) positions the discourse of other-emptiness in his interpretative system. I then demonstrate how Mipam’s portrayal of other-emptiness highlights the way he uses a perspectival means to incorporate a diversity of seemingly contradictory claims that he uses to support his view of ultimate reality as indeterminate. It is argued that an implication of his view is a non-representational account of language about the ultimate.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
This essay probes the discourses of other-emptiness in the Jonang (jo nang) and Nyingma (rnying ma) traditions. After briefly introducing other-emptiness in Jonang, the locus classicus for other-emptiness in Tibet, I contrast the way Mipam (‘ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) positions the discourse of other-emptiness in his interpretative system. I then demonstrate how Mipam’s portrayal of other-emptiness highlights the way he uses a perspectival means to incorporate a diversity of seemingly contradictory claims that he uses to support his view of ultimate reality as indeterminate. It is argued that an implication of his view is a non-representational account of language about the ultimate.
Key concepts: Emptiness, Philosophy, Epistemology