Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand
Harvey Kushner, Peter Reuter
Abstract
Harvey Kushner, Peter Reuter
Abstract
Winner of the 9984 Leslie T. Wilkins Award for the best book in criminology and criminal justice.Bookmaking, numbers, and loansharking are reputed to be major sources of revenue for organized crime, controlled by the visible hand of violence. For years this belief has formed the basis of government policy toward illegal markets. Drawing on police files, confiscated records, and interviews with police, prosecutors, and criminal informants, Reuter systematically refutes the notion that the Mafia, by using political connections and the threat of violence, controls the major illegal markets. Instead, he suggests that the cost of suppressing competition has ensured that these markets are populated with small enterprises, many of them marginal and ephemeral.Peter Reuter is a Senior Economist at the Rand Corporation. Disorganized Crime is included in The MIT Press Series on Organization Studies, edited by John Van Maanen.
OpenAlex reports 273 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Winner of the 9984 Leslie T. Wilkins Award for the best book in criminology and criminal justice.Bookmaking, numbers, and loansharking are reputed to be major sources of revenue for organized crime, controlled by the visible hand of violence. For years this belief has formed the basis of government policy toward illegal markets. Drawing on police files, confiscated records, and interviews with police, prosecutors, and criminal informants, Reuter systematically refutes the notion that the Mafia, by using political connections and the threat of violence, controls the major illegal markets. Instead, he suggests that the cost of suppressing competition has ensured that these markets are populated with small enterprises, many of them marginal and ephemeral.Peter Reuter is a Senior Economist at the Rand Corporation. Disorganized Crime is included in The MIT Press Series on Organization Studies, edited by John Van Maanen.
Key concepts: Economics, Criminology, Political science, Psychology