2017Unpublished venueRequires access

Grounds for Belief Aside, Does Evil Make Atheism More Reasonable than Theism?

William L. Rowe, Nick Trakakis

Open publisher page 6 citations

Abstract

The theist must believe that for each of these evils there is some greater good to which it leads, a good that an all-powerful being simply could not realize without permitting that evil. Although arguments from analogy are rather weak, the analogy in question has some merit if drawn between a good parent and a good deity of considerable but nevertheless finite power and knowledge. Having looked at a particular argument from evil against theistic belief, the chapter considers some theistic responses to this argument. If theists reject the argument for the nonexistence of God, they must either reject the first premise or the second premise. Most theists accept the second premise, as do nontheists. So, most theists must reject the first premise, holding instead that God has a justifying reason for permitting each and every horrendous evil that occurs.

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What this paper is about

The theist must believe that for each of these evils there is some greater good to which it leads, a good that an all-powerful being simply could not realize without permitting that evil. Although arguments from analogy are rather weak, the analogy in question has some merit if drawn between a good parent and a good deity of considerable but nevertheless finite power and knowledge. Having looked at a particular argument from evil against theistic belief, the chapter considers some theistic responses to this argument. If theists reject the argument for the nonexistence of God, they must either reject the first premise or the second premise. Most theists accept the second premise, as do nontheists. So, most theists must reject the first premise, holding instead that God has a justifying reason for permitting each and every horrendous evil that occurs.

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Available abstract

The theist must believe that for each of these evils there is some greater good to which it leads, a good that an all-powerful being simply could not realize without permitting that evil. Although arguments from analogy are rather weak, the analogy in question has some merit if drawn between a good parent and a good deity of considerable but nevertheless finite power and knowledge. Having looked at a particular argument from evil against theistic belief, the chapter considers some theistic responses to this argument. If theists reject the argument for the nonexistence of God, they must either reject the first premise or the second premise. Most theists accept the second premise, as do nontheists. So, most theists must reject the first premise, holding instead that God has a justifying reason for permitting each and every horrendous evil that occurs.

Key concepts: Atheism, Aside, Theism, Philosophy, Epistemology, Linguistics

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