TRUTH AS VALUE AND THE VALUE OF TRUTH

THB substance of Mr. Quick's article on " The Humanist Theory of Value,'' in No. 74 of this journal, is to maintain against Pragmatism the proposition, that " To define truth as value is to destroy the value of truth ".To be more specific, Mr. Quick's proposition is, " Many of our beliefs only have value for our lives in so far as they are held to be other than valuations, and the truth which they claim other than value; in particular is this true of religious and historical beliefs " (p.222).Mr. Quiok has drawn the issue between pragmatism and its opponents to a focal point, that of the relation of truth to value.Mr. Quick maintains that an idea must first be true in order to possess that sort of value in which the pragmatist finds the truth of the idea.Mr. Quick's contention is that the truth of an idea must itself be something which is other than value in order to possess any value.The pragmatist holds that a certain value of an idea is all that we can properly mean by its truth.The pragmatist maintains that truth is an abstract and general name for values of a particular sort.Such, it appears to me, is the issue between Mr. Quiok and what he calls " The Humanist Theory of Value ".Now, I am unable to see that Mr. Quick has made good his main contention, which is, that " To define truth as value is to destroy the value of truth''.So far, it seems to me, he has failed to meet the challenge of the pragmatist, that he define what this something, other than value, in which lies the essence of a true idea, really is.I cannot see that Mr. Quick has advanced in his discussion a step beyond the mere assertion of the matter he must prove against the doctrine, that truth is value.Mr. Quick has made admirably clear the point in dispute; but I am unable to see what he has brought forth which tends to disprove the pragmatist's meaning of truth.If Mr. Quiok is to maintain his proposition, that, unless the truth of an idea is other than value, that idea cannot have value, he is, I think, bound to state in terms that are concrete, what this something other than value really is.Does Mr. Quiok mean to content himself with the definition of truth as the agreement OE correspondence between the idea and its object-or reality ?If so, he must meet the ohallenge for-definite-and concrete terms of definition as most intelleotualists do, namely, by saying, " agreement or correspondence between