2012•The Political QuarterlyRequires access

The Credit Rating Agencies and Their Contribution to the Financial Crisis

Maurice Mullard

Open publisher page 43 citations

Abstract

The credit rating agencies that dominated the ratings of mortgage‐backed securities were Moody's and Standard & Poor's. The two agencies rated some 4.3 trillion dollars of bonds as triple AAA, yet within a period of 18 months these same rating agencies downgraded these bonds to below investment grade. This paper seeks to show that the ratings agencies business model, the issuer pays approach, led to major conflicts of interest with both the ratings agencies unable to walk away from a rating. The evidence given by analysts to Congressional Inquiries confirms a cultural revolution within the rating agencies, with analysts feeling unable to question the quality of a rating. Analysts who were described as being awkward by issuers were removed from the rating process. In the meantime, the income for the rating agencies increased from 3 billion dollars to 6 billion dollars, with the CEOs of the rating agencies receiving incomes comparable to the incomes to the CEOs of investment banks.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The credit rating agencies that dominated the ratings of mortgage‐backed securities were Moody's and Standard & Poor's. The two agencies rated some 4.3 trillion dollars of bonds as triple AAA, yet within a period of 18 months these same rating agencies downgraded these bonds to below investment grade. This paper seeks to show that the ratings agencies business model, the issuer pays approach, led to major conflicts of interest with both the ratings agencies unable to walk away from a rating. The evidence given by analysts to Congressional Inquiries confirms a cultural revolution within the rating agencies, with analysts feeling unable to question the quality of a rating. Analysts who were described as being awkward by issuers were removed from the rating process. In the meantime, the income for the rating agencies increased from 3 billion dollars to 6 billion dollars, with the CEOs of the rating agencies receiving incomes comparable to the incomes to the CEOs of investment banks.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 43 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

The credit rating agencies that dominated the ratings of mortgage‐backed securities were Moody's and Standard & Poor's. The two agencies rated some 4.3 trillion dollars of bonds as triple AAA, yet within a period of 18 months these same rating agencies downgraded these bonds to below investment grade. This paper seeks to show that the ratings agencies business model, the issuer pays approach, led to major conflicts of interest with both the ratings agencies unable to walk away from a rating. The evidence given by analysts to Congressional Inquiries confirms a cultural revolution within the rating agencies, with analysts feeling unable to question the quality of a rating. Analysts who were described as being awkward by issuers were removed from the rating process. In the meantime, the income for the rating agencies increased from 3 billion dollars to 6 billion dollars, with the CEOs of the rating agencies receiving incomes comparable to the incomes to the CEOs of investment banks.

Key concepts: Credit rating, Bond credit rating, Issuer, Bond, Credit enhancement, Business, Structured finance, Feeling

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
The Credit Rating Agencies and Their Contribution to the Financial Crisis — Research Paper | ScholarLens