Federalism As an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform
James M. Buchanan
Abstract
James M. Buchanan
Abstract
Federalism is first examined as an ideal-type political order as possibly emergent from initial constitutional agreement among members of a prospective political community. This abstracted and nonhistorical analysis is followed by an examination of the possible applicability of the federalist ideal as the basis for reform in specific historical-institutional settings. The direction of constitutional change toward effective federalism is discussed, with the devolution of political authority from centralized structures carefully distinguished from the limited concentration of authority from previously autonomous political units.
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Federalism is first examined as an ideal-type political order as possibly emergent from initial constitutional agreement among members of a prospective political community. This abstracted and nonhistorical analysis is followed by an examination of the possible applicability of the federalist ideal as the basis for reform in specific historical-institutional settings. The direction of constitutional change toward effective federalism is discussed, with the devolution of political authority from centralized structures carefully distinguished from the limited concentration of authority from previously autonomous political units.
Key concepts: Federalism, Federalist, Ideal (ethics), Devolution (biology), Politics, Political science, Order (exchange), Public administration