The study on US government aid for financial institutions
Peng Yu-liu
Abstract
Peng Yu-liu
Abstract
Since 2007 subprime lending crisis, the U.S. government has taken measures to rescue financial institutions to prevent an economic crisis. However, the government has ever taken policies which are constructive ambiguously to resist moral hazard. If the government rescue them all, the U.S. Government's finances are likely to be collapsed and consume more taxpayers' money. The fact that government assistance policy becomes ambiguously constructive would fundamentally reduce the moral hazard of the financial sector to improve the social support and the effectiveness of bail-out policy and sector self-discipline.
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Since 2007 subprime lending crisis, the U.S. government has taken measures to rescue financial institutions to prevent an economic crisis. However, the government has ever taken policies which are constructive ambiguously to resist moral hazard. If the government rescue them all, the U.S. Government's finances are likely to be collapsed and consume more taxpayers' money. The fact that government assistance policy becomes ambiguously constructive would fundamentally reduce the moral hazard of the financial sector to improve the social support and the effectiveness of bail-out policy and sector self-discipline.
Key concepts: Moral hazard, Constructive, Government (linguistics), Financial crisis, Business, Finance, Financial sector, Economic policy