Some Ontological Arguments

The principal arguments considered are in some ways similar to those offered in Anselm's Proslogium, Chapters II and III.In addition, two 'quick' versions of the ontological argument are examined.Finally, I worry a bit about the ineffable One.The general line of attack is similar to a procedure employed by David Lewis in discussing Proslogium II.My approach to Proslogium III is based upon the idea that the appropriate modal logic for these matters is much weaker than the standard SS.The hope is that this alternative perspective reveals features worthy of notice. A Prototype Reference Fixing DescriptionWe begin by trying to construct the appropriate reference fixing description for our task.The aim is to use it in attaching the name 'Max' to a real, or at least possible (or possibly possible, or ... , and so on) entity worthy of worship.This maneuver simplifies the exposition of some fairly tangled matters.Unfortunately, it requires the assumption that we can name non-existent entities.Many philosophers say this is impossible.I If they are right, it is muddleheaded, or at least question-begging, to use the name 'Max' in an argument purporting to show that such an entity actually exists.Let's take a quick look at this preliminary obstacle.Suppose we have before us all of the twenty-six parts necessary for the construction of a mechanical 'mouse.'Can we, or can we not, now name the particular 'mouse' that might be made of these parts?I think we can.In any case, it seems fairly clear we can produce a definite description that designates just that 'mouse.'The 'mouse' in question is the one we propose to construct of parts PI, P2, ... , P26.But, if this is so, why can't we now use that description to attach the name 'Mickey' to that possible 'mouse'?"The answer is obvious," someone may say, "there is, as yet, no such individual.How can the name 'Mickey' denote anything, given that the thing allegedly denoted is non-existent?"At this point, one is tempted to insist that Mickey does, sort of, in some sense, exist.The temptation should be resisted.Mickey doesn't exist in any way, shape, form, or manner.He is merely possible.The case provides strong grounds for thinking we can name, and discuss, particular individuals that are just plain non-existent.2 "So you hold there is at least one artifact that is non-existent?"This is a