Resistance to Decentralization under Medvedev and Putin

How political systems divide functions between levels of government is universally a subject of political struggle, with important implications for democracy, inequality, economic efficiency, and conflict resolution. Russia under Vladimir Putin has shifted from an anarchic proto-federalism in the 1990s to a highly centralized state. Over time, the negative consequences of over-centralization have generated pressures from regional leaders and other political actors to “re-decentralize.” This article, using Russian government documents, transcripts of meetings between officials, and press materials, examines this process in the period from 2008 (when Putin temporarily gave up the presidency to Dmitrii Medvedev) through December 2013 (a year and a half after Putin returned for his third term as president). It finds that decentralization has been successfully resisted by the entrenched interests that grew stronger as a result of Putin’s early centralizing efforts. Putin’s political system has ceded to ministries de facto veto power, and this has determined political outcomes. As an alternative to genuine decentralization to regions or cities, the Kremlin has sought a solution in what could be called “decentralization substitutes.” First, the new North Caucasus Federal District attempts to avoid decentralization to republic leaders by empowering Aleksandr Khloponin to coordinate development policies as both deputy prime minister and presidential representative. Second, the newly created Far East Development Ministry, based in Khabarovsk and initially headed by Viktor Ishaev, placed some responsibility for planning on Ishaev, who served simultaneously as government minister and presidential representative in the Far East Federal District. Third, state-run companies and corporations were increasingly viewed as the most effective mechanism for distributing budgetary resources and overseeing investment programs in the regions. Special corporations have ’been created ’both for the North Caucasus and the Far East regions. There is little evidence that these decentralization substitutes will produce the desired results, but they are more consistent with the precepts of the Putin era than would be a real shift of power to governors and regions.