Teruhisa Nakai
Abstract
This paper considers a bargaining problem between two negotiators containing an uncertain bargaining power. This problem is formulated as a static game of incomplete information. We consider several information patterns about a bargaining power and obtain linear Bayesian Nash equilibriums.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
This paper considers a bargaining problem between two negotiators containing an uncertain bargaining power. This problem is formulated as a static game of incomplete information. We consider several information patterns about a bargaining power and obtain linear Bayesian Nash equilibriums.
Key concepts: Bargaining problem, Complete information, Bargaining power, Bayesian game, Microeconomics, Economics, Mathematical economics, Information asymmetry