Strategic order splitting, order choice, and aggressiveness: Evidence from the Taiwan futures exchange
Robin K. Chou, Yun‐Yi Wang
Abstract
Robin K. Chou, Yun‐Yi Wang
Abstract
Abstract We investigate the strategic order‐splitting behavior and order aggressiveness of different types of traders using a unique dataset on the Taiwan Futures Exchange. By examining the trades and orders for each and every account, we find that, as compared with domestic institutional traders and individual traders, foreign institutional traders and futures proprietary firms are more likely to split their orders and it appears that the price adjustments after their trades are permanent. Foreign institutional traders and futures proprietary firms seem to be better informed, with their orders apparently being split so as to reveal their information on a gradual basis. Furthermore, we find that foreign institutional traders and futures proprietary firms use fewer market orders, choosing instead to submit aggressive limit orders, possibly due to their desire to make the most of their information advantage. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:1102–1129, 2009
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Abstract We investigate the strategic order‐splitting behavior and order aggressiveness of different types of traders using a unique dataset on the Taiwan Futures Exchange. By examining the trades and orders for each and every account, we find that, as compared with domestic institutional traders and individual traders, foreign institutional traders and futures proprietary firms are more likely to split their orders and it appears that the price adjustments after their trades are permanent. Foreign institutional traders and futures proprietary firms seem to be better informed, with their orders apparently being split so as to reveal their information on a gradual basis. Furthermore, we find that foreign institutional traders and futures proprietary firms use fewer market orders, choosing instead to submit aggressive limit orders, possibly due to their desire to make the most of their information advantage. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:1102–1129, 2009
Key concepts: Futures contract, Order (exchange), Futures market, Financial economics, Business, Foreign exchange, Economics, Monetary economics