Leo Strauss and Relativism: The Critique of Max Weber
Alan L. Mittleman
Abstract
Alan L. Mittleman
Abstract
Leo Strauss criticizes Max Weber as an historicist whose relativism mars the ethical quality of his work. Strauss suggests that Weber escapes this presumptive relativism by a religious route, namely, by grounding values in revelation and by professing to await another revelation which would save us from relativism. This paper argues, in Weber's defence, against the charges of relativism and historicism. Strauss slights Weber's own understanding of ‘value free’ scientific inquiry. Value freedom can be interpreted not only as a methodological principle but also as a moral purpose.
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Leo Strauss criticizes Max Weber as an historicist whose relativism mars the ethical quality of his work. Strauss suggests that Weber escapes this presumptive relativism by a religious route, namely, by grounding values in revelation and by professing to await another revelation which would save us from relativism. This paper argues, in Weber's defence, against the charges of relativism and historicism. Strauss slights Weber's own understanding of ‘value free’ scientific inquiry. Value freedom can be interpreted not only as a methodological principle but also as a moral purpose.
Key concepts: Relativism, Historicism, Revelation, Philosophy, Epistemology, Value (mathematics), Cultural relativism, Theology