Rocky START: optimism and obstacles on the road to reductions
Michèle A. Flournoy
Abstract
Michèle A. Flournoy
Abstract
For the past several months, reports of progress toward a US-Soviet agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) have all but eclipsed discussion of negotiations in other arms control arenas. Recently, however, US and Soviet officials have expressed renewed optimism that an accord to reduce strategic offensive arms may follow closely on the heels of an INF treaty. Given the limited progress that has been made in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) since the 1986 Reykjavik summit, this optimism is surprising. No doubt the momentum and general popularity of the INF negotiations have whetted the appetites of leaders on both sides hungry for a place in history as men of peace. Both Shultz and Shevardnadze characterized the imminent INF treaty as a beginning, a first step toward a more significant nuclear arms control agreement. More telling, perhaps, is a growing hope among some US officials that the Soviet Union may break the stalemate by changing its approach to START in time for the Reagan administration to shepherd a second arms control treaty through the Senate-ratification process.
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For the past several months, reports of progress toward a US-Soviet agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) have all but eclipsed discussion of negotiations in other arms control arenas. Recently, however, US and Soviet officials have expressed renewed optimism that an accord to reduce strategic offensive arms may follow closely on the heels of an INF treaty. Given the limited progress that has been made in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) since the 1986 Reykjavik summit, this optimism is surprising. No doubt the momentum and general popularity of the INF negotiations have whetted the appetites of leaders on both sides hungry for a place in history as men of peace. Both Shultz and Shevardnadze characterized the imminent INF treaty as a beginning, a first step toward a more significant nuclear arms control agreement. More telling, perhaps, is a growing hope among some US officials that the Soviet Union may break the stalemate by changing its approach to START in time for the Reagan administration to shepherd a second arms control treaty through the Senate-ratification process.
Key concepts: Arms control, Treaty, Stalemate, Political science, Optimism, Summit, Negotiation, Ratification