Solving the Bilevel Facility Location Problem under Preferences by a Stackelberg‐Evolutionary Algorithm
José‐Fernando Camacho‐Vallejo, Alvaro E. Cordero-Franco, Rosa G. González‐Ramírez
Abstract
Open-access reader
José‐Fernando Camacho‐Vallejo, Alvaro E. Cordero-Franco, Rosa G. González‐Ramírez
Abstract
Open-access reader
This research highlights the use of game theory to solve the classical problem of the uncapacitated facility location optimization model with customer order preferences through a bilevel approach. The bilevel model provided herein consists of the classical facility location problem and an optimization of the customer preferences, which are the upper and lower level problems, respectively. Also, two reformulations of the bilevel model are presented, reducing it into a mixed‐integer single‐level problem. An evolutionary algorithm based on the equilibrium in a Stackelberg’s game is proposed to solve the bilevel model. Numerical experimentation is performed in this study and the results are compared to benchmarks from the existing literature on the subject in order to emphasize the benefits of the proposed approach in terms of solution quality and estimation time.
OpenAlex reports 55 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
This research highlights the use of game theory to solve the classical problem of the uncapacitated facility location optimization model with customer order preferences through a bilevel approach. The bilevel model provided herein consists of the classical facility location problem and an optimization of the customer preferences, which are the upper and lower level problems, respectively. Also, two reformulations of the bilevel model are presented, reducing it into a mixed‐integer single‐level problem. An evolutionary algorithm based on the equilibrium in a Stackelberg’s game is proposed to solve the bilevel model. Numerical experimentation is performed in this study and the results are compared to benchmarks from the existing literature on the subject in order to emphasize the benefits of the proposed approach in terms of solution quality and estimation time.
Key concepts: Bilevel optimization, Stackelberg competition, Mathematical optimization, Computer science, Facility location problem, Integer (computer science), Order (exchange), Game theory