The Importance of Commitment in the New Keynesian Model
Jean‐Paul Lam
Abstract
Jean‐Paul Lam
Abstract
In the New Keynesian model, even if the central bank does not have an over-ambitious output target, policy under discretion leads to an inefficiency known as the stabilization bias. In this paper, using a New Keynesian model, we explore and quantify how a cost channel and multi-period data revisions affect the size of the stabilization bias. We find that the presence of a cost channel in the model increases the stabilization bias significantly. On the other hand, multi-period revisions to output and inflation reduce the inefficiency associated with discretionary policy.
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In the New Keynesian model, even if the central bank does not have an over-ambitious output target, policy under discretion leads to an inefficiency known as the stabilization bias. In this paper, using a New Keynesian model, we explore and quantify how a cost channel and multi-period data revisions affect the size of the stabilization bias. We find that the presence of a cost channel in the model increases the stabilization bias significantly. On the other hand, multi-period revisions to output and inflation reduce the inefficiency associated with discretionary policy.
Key concepts: Inefficiency, Economics, New Keynesian economics, Discretion, Inflation (cosmology), Monetary policy, Keynesian economics, Stabilization policy