2012Unpublished venueRequires access

Architecture of the remote routing validation tool for BGP anomaly detection

Je-Kuk Yun, Changhyun Byun, Yanggon Kim

Open publisher page 1 citations

Abstract

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an Inter-domain routing protocol that has gradually evolved over the past few decades. The main functionality of BGP is to exchange Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) between ASes so that a BGP speaker can find a better path to the destination of packets. However, BGP is highly vulnerable to a variety of attacks such as IP hijacking, masquerade, and Denial of Service (DOS). In order to protect BGP, there is a plethora of research on BGP security, such as Secure BGP (S-BGP), Secure Origin BGP (SO-BGP), Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP), Pretty Good BGP (pgBGP), and so on. In this paper, we propose Architecture of the Remote Routing Validation Tool (RRVT) which provides a communication channel between ordinary BGP routers and BGP-SRx server so that the ordinary BGP routers can validate BGP messages. BGP-SRx server, developed by NIST, offers the interface to the RPKI/ROA validation Cache using the RPKI.

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What this paper is about

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an Inter-domain routing protocol that has gradually evolved over the past few decades. The main functionality of BGP is to exchange Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) between ASes so that a BGP speaker can find a better path to the destination of packets. However, BGP is highly vulnerable to a variety of attacks such as IP hijacking, masquerade, and Denial of Service (DOS). In order to protect BGP, there is a plethora of research on BGP security, such as Secure BGP (S-BGP), Secure Origin BGP (SO-BGP), Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP), Pretty Good BGP (pgBGP), and so on. In this paper, we propose Architecture of the Remote Routing Validation Tool (RRVT) which provides a communication channel between ordinary BGP routers and BGP-SRx server so that the ordinary BGP routers can validate BGP messages. BGP-SRx server, developed by NIST, offers the interface to the RPKI/ROA validation Cache using the RPKI.

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Available abstract

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an Inter-domain routing protocol that has gradually evolved over the past few decades. The main functionality of BGP is to exchange Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) between ASes so that a BGP speaker can find a better path to the destination of packets. However, BGP is highly vulnerable to a variety of attacks such as IP hijacking, masquerade, and Denial of Service (DOS). In order to protect BGP, there is a plethora of research on BGP security, such as Secure BGP (S-BGP), Secure Origin BGP (SO-BGP), Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP), Pretty Good BGP (pgBGP), and so on. In this paper, we propose Architecture of the Remote Routing Validation Tool (RRVT) which provides a communication channel between ordinary BGP routers and BGP-SRx server so that the ordinary BGP routers can validate BGP messages. BGP-SRx server, developed by NIST, offers the interface to the RPKI/ROA validation Cache using the RPKI.

Key concepts: Border Gateway Protocol, Default-free zone, Computer science, Computer network, Network mapping, Routing protocol, Denial-of-service attack, Network packet

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