2014•Automation and Remote ControlRequires access

Nash equilibrium in differential games and the quasi-strategy formalism

Yurii Vladimirovich Averboukh

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Abstract

We consider a two-player nonzero-sum differential game in the case where players use nonanticipative strategies. We define the Nash equilibrium in this case and obtain a characterization of Nash equilibrium strategies. We show that a Nash equilibrium solution can be approximately realized by control-with-guide strategies.

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We consider a two-player nonzero-sum differential game in the case where players use nonanticipative strategies. We define the Nash equilibrium in this case and obtain a characterization of Nash equilibrium strategies. We show that a Nash equilibrium solution can be approximately realized by control-with-guide strategies.

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Available abstract

We consider a two-player nonzero-sum differential game in the case where players use nonanticipative strategies. We define the Nash equilibrium in this case and obtain a characterization of Nash equilibrium strategies. We show that a Nash equilibrium solution can be approximately realized by control-with-guide strategies.

Key concepts: Nash equilibrium, Epsilon-equilibrium, Best response, Correlated equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Differential game, Equilibrium selection, Solution concept

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