2014•Economic TheoryRequires access
Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
Bernard Lebrun
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Bernard Lebrun
Abstract
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OpenAlex reports 5 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
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Key concepts: English auction, Revenue equivalence, Common value auction, Vickrey auction, Unique bid auction, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, Auction theory, Microeconomics