2013•Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and ConstructionRequires access

Refocusing on Liquidated Damages in Incentive/Disincentive Contracts

Carlos C. Sun, Praveen K. Edara, Andrew Mackley

Open publisher page 14 citations

Abstract

Incentive/disincentive (I/D) clauses are designed to award payments to contractors if they complete work ahead of schedule and to deduct payments if they overrun the completion time. The use of incentive/disincentive clauses in transportation is heavily influenced by the code of federal regulations. The intended effect of this regulation is to facilitate the inclusion of road user costs (RUC) to accelerate projects. However, the unintended consequence is for disincentives to be construed as unenforceable penalties as illustrated in previous cases. This paper argues for an alternate approach to disincentives in which liquidated damages include all reasonable foreseeable damages, including RUC. The reasons for this approach are to prevent RUC from being construed as impermissible security for performance, to avoid double counting RUC, and to reflect the asymmetry in the legal principles justifying disincentives as opposed to incentives. In addition to the aforementioned legal issues, state transportation departments (STD) often need to consider other issues such as public perception of incentives. This article also discusses some other relevant legal issues, such as constructive acceleration/suspension and sovereign immunity. This article is intended for both agency attorneys and contract engineers who work in the area of contract acceleration.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Incentive/disincentive (I/D) clauses are designed to award payments to contractors if they complete work ahead of schedule and to deduct payments if they overrun the completion time. The use of incentive/disincentive clauses in transportation is heavily influenced by the code of federal regulations. The intended effect of this regulation is to facilitate the inclusion of road user costs (RUC) to accelerate projects. However, the unintended consequence is for disincentives to be construed as unenforceable penalties as illustrated in previous cases. This paper argues for an alternate approach to disincentives in which liquidated damages include all reasonable foreseeable damages, including RUC. The reasons for this approach are to prevent RUC from being construed as impermissible security for performance, to avoid double counting RUC, and to reflect the asymmetry in the legal principles justifying disincentives as opposed to incentives. In addition to the aforementioned legal issues, state transportation departments (STD) often need to consider other issues such as public perception of incentives. This article also discusses some other relevant legal issues, such as constructive acceleration/suspension and sovereign immunity. This article is intended for both agency attorneys and contract engineers who work in the area of contract acceleration.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 14 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Incentive/disincentive (I/D) clauses are designed to award payments to contractors if they complete work ahead of schedule and to deduct payments if they overrun the completion time. The use of incentive/disincentive clauses in transportation is heavily influenced by the code of federal regulations. The intended effect of this regulation is to facilitate the inclusion of road user costs (RUC) to accelerate projects. However, the unintended consequence is for disincentives to be construed as unenforceable penalties as illustrated in previous cases. This paper argues for an alternate approach to disincentives in which liquidated damages include all reasonable foreseeable damages, including RUC. The reasons for this approach are to prevent RUC from being construed as impermissible security for performance, to avoid double counting RUC, and to reflect the asymmetry in the legal principles justifying disincentives as opposed to incentives. In addition to the aforementioned legal issues, state transportation departments (STD) often need to consider other issues such as public perception of incentives. This article also discusses some other relevant legal issues, such as constructive acceleration/suspension and sovereign immunity. This article is intended for both agency attorneys and contract engineers who work in the area of contract acceleration.

Key concepts: Incentive, Damages, Payment, Agency (philosophy), Business, Law and economics, Economics, Public economics

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Refocusing on Liquidated Damages in Incentive/Disincentive Contracts — Research Paper | ScholarLens