Terror management and attributions of blame to innocent victims: Reconciling compassionate and defensive responses.
Gilad Hirschberger
Abstract
Gilad Hirschberger
Abstract
In this article, 4 studies test the hypothesis that reminders of personal death bias the normative attribution process and increase the motivation to blame severely injured, innocent victims. In Studies 1 and 2, primes of death led to greater attributions of blame to severely injured victims but did not significantly influence attributions of blame to either mildly injured victims or negatively portrayed others. In Study 3, primes of death led to greater attributions of blame to victims of circumstance but did not influence attributions of blame to victims who were explicitly responsible for their condition. In Study 4, innocent victims who were severely injured elicited more death-related cognitions than did victims who were responsible for their condition or who were only mildly injured. These findings indicate that the predictions of normative models of attribution may be moderated, and even overturned, when observers are reminded of their personal death such that defensive needs override rational inferential processes.
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In this article, 4 studies test the hypothesis that reminders of personal death bias the normative attribution process and increase the motivation to blame severely injured, innocent victims. In Studies 1 and 2, primes of death led to greater attributions of blame to severely injured victims but did not significantly influence attributions of blame to either mildly injured victims or negatively portrayed others. In Study 3, primes of death led to greater attributions of blame to victims of circumstance but did not influence attributions of blame to victims who were explicitly responsible for their condition. In Study 4, innocent victims who were severely injured elicited more death-related cognitions than did victims who were responsible for their condition or who were only mildly injured. These findings indicate that the predictions of normative models of attribution may be moderated, and even overturned, when observers are reminded of their personal death such that defensive needs override rational inferential processes.
Key concepts: Attribution, Blame, Psychology, Normative, Social psychology, Terror management theory, Epistemology, Philosophy