A Desire Named Streetcar Fantasy and Fact in Rail Transit Planning
Don Pickrell
Abstract
Don Pickrell
Abstract
The forecasts that led local officials in eight U.S. cities to advocate rail transit projects over competing, less capital-intensive options grossly overestimated rail transit ridership and underestimated rail construction costs and operating expenses. These mistakes cannot be explained by such obvious sources as errors in projecting the input variables of the ridership forecasting models, or changes in the design of projects. Although planners could reduce the magnitude of the errors by various technical improvements in the forecasting process, the structure of transit grant programs and the existence of dedicated funding sources provide little incentive for local officials to seek accurate information in evaluating alternatives. The resulting bias toward high-capital transit investments is thus unlikely to be eliminated without restructuring both federal transit grant programs and local financing mechanisms.
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The forecasts that led local officials in eight U.S. cities to advocate rail transit projects over competing, less capital-intensive options grossly overestimated rail transit ridership and underestimated rail construction costs and operating expenses. These mistakes cannot be explained by such obvious sources as errors in projecting the input variables of the ridership forecasting models, or changes in the design of projects. Although planners could reduce the magnitude of the errors by various technical improvements in the forecasting process, the structure of transit grant programs and the existence of dedicated funding sources provide little incentive for local officials to seek accurate information in evaluating alternatives. The resulting bias toward high-capital transit investments is thus unlikely to be eliminated without restructuring both federal transit grant programs and local financing mechanisms.
Key concepts: Transit (satellite), Restructuring, Incentive, Rail transit, Capital (architecture), Transport engineering, Finance, Process (computing)