2006•Philosophical StudiesRequires access
The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience
Neil Feit
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Neil Feit
Abstract
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Key concepts: Internalism and externalism, Supervenience, Philosophy of mind, Doctrine, Philosophy, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy of language