2014•International Journal of Game TheoryRequires access

On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games

René van den Brink, René Levı́nský, Miroslav Zelený

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Key concepts: Shapley value, Transferable utility, Monotone polygon, Mathematical economics, Bondareva–Shapley theorem, Context (archaeology), Cooperative game theory, Dividend