John Rawls, 'Political Liberalism.'

In Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls deployed social contract theory to vindicate principles of civil liberty and distributive without appeal to utilitarian calculus. Rawls described his conception of as as fairness. Rational contractors, deliberating behind veil of ignorance, agree to scheme of prior to knowing how scheme materially affects their individual interests or conceptions of moral or nonmoral good(s).(1) Perhaps most striking and certainly one of most controversial features of Rawls's Theory was his argument that the right subordinates (for purposes of order) not only material interests in economic sphere, but also individuals' fully considered conceptions of moral good, human flourishing, and final ends.(2) Hence, Rawls's theory of was meant to be systematic alternative both to economic pragmatism of other modem contract theorists as well as to classical tradition of perfectionism in theory. This long-awaited sequel consists of chapters based in part upon lectures and published work over past two decades. Political Liberalism, however, not simply collection of essays.(3) Rawls notes that reached clear understanding of liberalism--or so I think--only in past few years (p. xxxi). Therefore, book does not just retine and correct doctrine in Theory but gives an entirely new focus to project. He calls this new focus political liberalism. Rawls explains that serious shortcoming of Theory was his failure to adequately distinguish between a moral doctrine of general in scope and a strictly conception of justice (p. xv). If as fairness based upon general moral theory, then it would seem that citizens must endorse philosophical doctrine in order to reach consensus about principles which ought to inform institutions of polity. He now points out that this an impractical expectation. The fact that doctrine of contains thin understanding of moral values, and fact that it stipulates general moral reasons why perfectionist values must be excluded from principles and institutions of order, does not make doctrine less comprehensive (in sense given to this term in Political Liberalism).(4) For example, in comparison to Plato or Hegel, Ronald Dworkin's work represents relatively thin and certainly antiperfectionistic account of justice. Rawls correctly observes, however, that Dworkin treats according to general theory of moral values. Accordingly constraints placed upon public reason are drawn from ethical conception of values. To this extent, Dworkin's liberalism comprehensive.(5) So, too, was Theory. For two decades friends and foes of Theory read it as more or less complete liberal conception of that could compete with other more or less complete theories of subject. Indeed, almost immediately upon its publication there emerged considerable body of secondary literature, purporting to detect or develop implicit ontology and epistemology of Theory in order to make it more serviceable as account of justice.(6) Yet Rawls also had in mind narrower goal for Theory, which was to show how rational agents can reach consensus about principles of for purpose of institutions. Rawls now acknowledges that there something unrealistic about possibility of reaching practical consensus when theory itself affords occasion for dispute (p. xvii). A modern democratic society, he notes, is chaaracterized not simply by pluralism of religious, philosophical, and moral but by pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable doctrines (p. xvi). Since no one of these affirmed by citizens generally, we cannot expect unanimity. …