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2011•SSRN Electronic JournalOpen access

Finding the Set of Core Allocations in Matching Markets with Externalities

Mustafa Oğuz Afacan

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Abstract

We study two-sided matching markets with externalities. In this kind of markets, agents have to count on the reactions of others when they deviate from the given matching. In the literature, agents expectations about these reactions are specif ed via so called estimation functions, and there are three approaches in their specif cations. The current paper provides an algorithm for each specif cation to find the set of core allocations.

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What this paper is about

We study two-sided matching markets with externalities. In this kind of markets, agents have to count on the reactions of others when they deviate from the given matching. In the literature, agents expectations about these reactions are specif ed via so called estimation functions, and there are three approaches in their specif cations. The current paper provides an algorithm for each specif cation to find the set of core allocations.

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Available abstract

We study two-sided matching markets with externalities. In this kind of markets, agents have to count on the reactions of others when they deviate from the given matching. In the literature, agents expectations about these reactions are specif ed via so called estimation functions, and there are three approaches in their specif cations. The current paper provides an algorithm for each specif cation to find the set of core allocations.

Key concepts: Externality, Matching (statistics), Core (optical fiber), Set (abstract data type), Microeconomics, Economics, Computer science, Mathematics

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