THOMAS KUHN’S THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

LISA J. ROBERTS [*] In preface to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn cites as unifying many of his studies a problem-structure and orientation including the way in which experimental bases of a new are accumulated and assimilated by men committed to an incompatible older theory (SSR p.ix). [1] This phenomenon contributed greatly to movement in Kuhn's career from physics, to historiography, to more philosophical issues concerning nature of development itself. As result of his studies, Kuhn emphasized role of community in development. He challenged brick-to-building metaphor endorsed by textbooks, suggesting instead that progress occurs in form of revolutions and does not follow an uninterrupted linear path, as traditional schoolbooks would lead us to believe. These revolutions erupt not as direct result of emergence of new data, but only after a community embraces a new model in place of an o ld one. Kuhn identified these universally recognized achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners, as (SSR p.x). As pool of knowledge grows in quality as well as quantity, documenting who did what and when becomes more difficult beyond just recognizing and ordering scientific aspects of what we have long since dismissed as myth or superstition. Historians attempting to refine our knowledge of history encounter many problems as they evaluate past events based on current knowledge. Contemporary methods of historical have given way to problems in categorizing inventions and discoveries, while they further call into question concept of development-by-accumulation assigned to process. The simple piling up of facts as a means of documenting chronology ignores a very important factor in progress -- community of practitioners involved. Thus, Kuhn argued for a new method of historiography which addresses a of revolutions. Kuhn states clearly fundamental objective of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as that of urg[ing] a change in perception and evaluation of familiar data (pp.x-xi). He exemplifies his paradigms by re-evaluating normal science -- particularly that of physics -- which he defines as research firmly based upon one or more past achievements, achievements that some particular community acknowledges for a time as supplying foundation for its further practice (p.10). Kuhn's of revolutions represents tradition-shattering complements to tradition-bound activity of science (p.6), namely orientations which contribute to a community's acceptance or rejection of a new theory. Traditional historiography would have one believe that progress relies on discovery of facts, or of truth, and that any number of scientists presented with same problem will obtain same factual solution. Not so, said Kuhn. The proba bility of accurate results may depend on scientist's proper use of method, but it also depends on his social-scientific orientation: Does he define a swinging pendulum by laws of gravity or by those of motion? Today, anyone with a basic knowledge of would acknowledge both, but years ago one clashed incommensurably with other. Thus, devotion to one paradigm or another involves more than empiricism; it depends on community to which a practitioner belongs. In Chapter I of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn overviews his of paradigms and offers a rationale for remaining twelve sections of book. Chapter II anticipates inevitable role of incommensurability. In Chapters III, IV, and V, Kuhn expands upon function of and conceptual boxes that accompany it. …